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This paper analyses theoretically and empirically the relationship between military conflicts and
trade. We show that the conventional wisdom that trade promotes peace is only partially true even in a
model where trade is economically beneficial, military conflicts reduce trade, and leaders are rational.
When war can occur because of the presence of asymmetric information, the probability of escalation
is lower for countries that trade more bilaterally because of the opportunity cost associated with the
loss of trade gains. However, countries more open to global trade have a higher probability of war be-
cause multilateral trade openness decreases bilateral dependence to any given country and the cost of
a bilateral conflict. We test our predictions on a large data set of military conflicts on the 1950–2000
period. Using different strategies to solve the endogeneity issues, including instrumental variables, we
find robust evidence for the contrasting effects of bilateral and multilateral trade openness. For prox-
imate countries, we find that trade has had a surprisingly large effect on their probability of military
conflict.
1. INTRODUCTION
The natural effect of trade is to bring about peace. Two nations which trade together, render
themselves reciprocally dependent; for if one has an interest in buying, the other has an
interest in selling; and all unions are based upon mutual needs. (Montesquieu, De l’esprit
des Lois, 1758).
I will never falter in my belief that enduring peace and the welfare of nations are indis-
solubly connected with friendliness, fairness, equality, and the maximum practicable degree
of freedom in international trade.” (Cordell Hull, U.S. secretary of state, 1933–1944).
Does globalization pacify international relations? The “liberal” view in political science
argues that increasing trade flows and the spread of free markets and democracy
should limit the incentive to use military force in interstate relations. This vision, which can
partly be traced back to Kant’s Essay on Perpetual Peace (1795), has been very influ-
ential: The main objective of the European trade integration process was to prevent the
killing and destruction of the two World Wars from ever happening again.1 Figure 1
1. Before this, the 1860 Anglo-French commercial treaty was signed to diffuse tensions between the two countries.
Outside Europe, MERCOSUR was created in 1991 in part to curtail the military power in Argentina and Brazil and then
two recent and fragile democracies with potential conflicts over natural resources.
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FIGURE 1
Militarized conflict probability and trade openness over time
suggests2 however, that during the 1870–2001 period, the correlation between trade openness
and military conflicts is not a clear cut one. The first era of globalization, at the end of the 19th
century, was a period of rising trade openness and multiple military conflicts, culminating with
World War I. Then, the interwar period was characterized by a simultaneous collapse of world
trade and conflicts. After World War II, world trade increased rapidly, while the number of con-
flicts decreased (although the risk of a global conflict was obviously high). There is no clear
evidence that the 1990s, during which trade flows increased dramatically, was a period of lower
prevalence of military conflicts, even taking into account the increase in the number of sovereign
states.
The objective of this paper is to shed light on the following question: If trade promotes
peace as suggested by the European example, why is it that globalization, interpreted as trade
liberalization at the global level, has not lived up to its promise of decreasing the prevalence of
violent interstate conflicts? We offer a theoretical and empirical answer to this question. On the
theoretical side, we build a framework where escalation to military conflicts may occur because
of the failure of negotiations in a bargaining game. The structure of this game is fairly general:
(1) war is Pareto dominated by peace, (2) countries have private information, and (3) countries
can choose any type of negotiation protocol. We then embed this game in a standard new trade
theory model. We show that a pair of countries with more bilateral trade has a lower probability of
bilateral war. However, multilateral trade openness has the opposite effect: Any pair of countries
more open with the rest of the world decreases its degree of bilateral dependence and its cost of a
2. Figure 1 depicts the occurrence of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) between country pairs divided by the
total number of country pairs. Figure 1 accounts for events characterized by display of force, use of force, and military
conflicts with at least 1000 deaths of military personnel. See Section 3.1 for a more precise description of the data. Trade
openness is the sum of world trade (exports and imports) divided by world GDP (trade data come from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) data set and Barbieri (2002) while GDP figures come from
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) and Maddison (2001) for historical data).
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bilateral conflict, and this results in a higher probability of bilateral war. A theoretical prediction
of our model is that globalization of trade flows changes the nature of conflicts. It decreases the
probability of global conflicts (maybe the most costly in terms of human welfare) but increases
the probability of any bilateral conflict. The reason for the second result is that globalization
decreases the bilateral dependence for any country pair, and this weakens the incentive to make
concessions in order to avoid the escalation of a dispute into a bilateral military conflict. This
is especially true for countries with a high probability of dispute with a local dimension such as
disputes on borders, resources, and ethnic minorities.
We test the theoretical prediction that bilateral and multilateral trade have opposite effects
on the probability of bilateral military conflicts on the 1950–2000 period using a data set from
the Correlates of War (COW) project that makes available a very precise description of interstate
armed conflicts. The mechanism at work in our theoretical model rests on the hypothesis that the
absence of peace disrupts trade and therefore puts trade gains at risk. We first test this hypothesis.
Using a gravity-type model of trade, we find that bilateral trade costs indeed increase signifi-
cantly with a bilateral conflict. However, multilateral trade costs do not increase significantly.
Second, we test the predictions of the model related to the contradictory effects of bilateral and
multilateral trade on conflict. We address the endogeneity issue by controlling for various co-
determinants of conflict and trade; by including country pair fixed effects and time effects; and,
finally, by implementing an instrumental variable strategy. Our results are robust to these dif-
ferent estimation strategies. The quantitative impact of trade is surprisingly large for proximate
countries (those with a bilateral distance less than 1000 km), those for which the probability of
a conflict is the highest. We estimate the quantitative effect of the globalization process of the
past 30 years that is characterized by expansion of both bilateral trade flows (with a negative
impact on the probability of conflict) and multilateral trade flows (with a positive impact on this
probability). We find that its net effect has been to increase the probability of a bilateral con-
flict by around 20% for proximate countries. However, for more distant countries, the effect of
globalization on their bilateral relation has been very small. This fits well with the stylized fact
depicted by Figure 2. This strongly suggests that conflicts have become more localized over time
as the average distance between two countries in military conflict has been halved during the
1950–2000 period. It is consistent with the changing nature of war as discussed by historians
(Keegan, 1984; Bond, 1986; Van Creveld, 1991).
FIGURE 2
Average distance of militarized conflicts over time
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The related literature ranges from political science to political economy. The question of the
impact of trade on war is an old and a controversial one among political scientists (see Barbieri
and Schneider, 1999; Kapstein, 2003, for recent surveys). From a theoretical point of view, the
main debate is between the “trade promotes peace” liberal school and the neo-Marxist school
which argues that asymmetric trade links lead to conflicts. The main difference between these
two positions comes from the opposing view they have on the possibility of gains from trade for
all countries involved. From an empirical point of view, recent studies in political science test
the impact of bilateral trade (in different forms) on the frequency of war between country pairs.
Many find a negative relationship (see, e.g. Polachek, 1980; Mansfield, 1995; Polachek, Robst
and Chang, 1999; Oneal and Russet, 1999). However, some recent studies have found a positive
relationship (see Barbieri, 1996, 2002). These papers, however, do not test models in which trade
and war are both endogenous.3 In economics, related empirical papers on the issue are recent
papers by Blomberg and Hess (2006) and Glick and Taylor (2005). They, however, focus on the
reverse causal link, that is on the effect of war on trade. They control for the standard determinants
of trade as used in the gravity equation literature. To our knowledge, our paper is, however, the
first to derive theoretically the two-sided effect of trade on peace (positive for bilateral trade and
negative for multilateral trade) and to empirically test this prediction.
Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001, 2002) show in a theoretical model that terms of trade
effects may intensify conflict over resources, a mechanism from which we abstract in the theo-
retical model. We also abstract from internal conflicts between factors of production that may be
generated by opening to trade as in Schneider and Schulze (2005). The recent literature on the
number and size of countries (see Alesina and Spolaore, 1997, 2003) has also clear connections
with our paper because in both frameworks, a key mechanism is that globalization reduces local
economic dependence. In Alesina and Spolaore, the consequence is an increase in the equilib-
rium number of countries. In our framework, it decreases the opportunity cost of conflict and
increases the equilibrium number of local wars. Alesina and Spolaore (2005, 2006) also study
the link between conflicts, defence spending, and the number of countries. Their model aims to
explain how a decrease in international conflicts can be associated with an increase in localized
conflicts between a higher number of smaller countries. Their explanation is the following: When
international conflicts become less frequent, the advantages of large countries (in terms of pro-
vision of public and defence goods) weaken so that countries split and the number of countries
increases. This itself leads to an increase in the number of (localized) conflicts. In our paper, the
number and size of countries are exogenous but trade and the probability of escalation to war are
endogenous.
The next section derives the theoretical probability of escalation to war between two coun-
tries as a function of the degree of asymmetric information, bilateral and multilateral trade, and
analyses the ambiguous impact of trade on peace. Section 3 first quantifies the impact of war
on both bilateral and multilateral trade and then tests the impact of trade openness, bilateral and
multilateral, on the probability of military conflicts between countries.
2. THE THEORY
In this section, we analyse a simple model of negotiation and escalation to war. We then embed
it in a model of trade to assess the marginal impact of trade on war.
3. The list of controls included are those most cited in the political science literature (democratic level, military
capabilities, etc.) but rarely include determinants of trade that could also affect the probability of war. For example,
Barbieri (1996, 2002) does not include distance as one of her controls even though it is well known that bilateral distance
affects very negatively both bilateral trade and the probability of conflicts (Kocs, 1995).
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2.1. Escalation to war under asymmetric information
We follow the rationalist view of war among political scientists (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 1999,
for surveys) and economists (Grossman, 2003) whose aim is to explain the puzzle that wars do
occur despite their costs, even in the presence of rational leaders. The rationalist view is the most
natural structure for our argument because trade gains are then taken into account in the decision
to go to war.4
Studies in the rationalist view of war, however, greatly differ with respect to their assump-
tions on institutional setting and the negotiation protocols. In this paper, the only institutional
constraint we impose is that the negotiation protocol (bilateral or multilateral negotiations, re-
peated stages, etc.) chosen is the one that maximizes the ex ante welfare of both countries. This
more general view has two advantages. First, it avoids the main drawback of the existing liter-
ature, namely the high sensitivity of results to the underlying restrictions made on institutions.
Second, it is fully consistent with the rationalist school view of war, as rationality implies that
leaders choose the most efficient institutional setting and negotiation protocol.
We assume that wars can occur because disputes may escalate into a military conflict. In
our model, disputes are exogenous but the probability of escalation is endogenous. Consider two
countries i and j . Disputes on how to share the surplus under peace may arise between these
two countries. They can end peacefully if countries succeed through a negotiated settlement or
can escalate into military conflict if negotiations fail. The timing of the game is the following: A
negotiation protocol is optimally chosen; then, information is privately revealed and negotiations
take place. War occurs or not depending on the outcome of negotiations. Production, trade, and
consumption are then realized as described in the next section.
Leaders in both countries care about the utility level of a representative agent of their own
country who, in peace, obtains, respectively, (U Pi ,U Pj ). In a situation of war, they obtain the
outside option (U˜ Wi , U˜ Wj ). Peace Pareto dominates war so that the gains of the winning country
are lower than the losses of the defeated country:
S P ≡ U Pi +U Pj > U˜ Wi + U˜ Wj ≡ S˜W . (1)
Escalation to war is avoided whenever countries i and j agree on a sharing rule of S P . We
assume that the outside options of each country (U˜ Wi ,U˜ Wj ) are not perfectly known by the other
country at the time of negotiation. More precisely:
U˜ Wi = (1+ u˜i )U Wi , U˜ Wj = (1+ u˜ j )U Wj , E(u˜i ) = E(u˜ j ) = 0,var(u˜i ) = var(u˜ j ) = V 2/8, (2)
where u˜i and u˜ j are privately known by each country. Hence, the parameter V measures the
degree of informational asymmetry between the countries. On average, outside options are equal
4. Scholars in political sciences have developed two alternative arguments: (1) agents (and state leaders) may be
irrational and misperceive the costs of war and (2) leaders may be those who enjoy the benefits of war while the costs are
suffered by other agents (citizens and soldiers). We ignore those alternative explanations of war because it is unlikely that
the trade openness channel interacts with them. Indeed, an irrational leader may decide to go to war whatever the trade
loss suffered by his country. Similarly, the way the trade surplus (and the trade loss in case of conflict) is shared between
political leaders and the rest of the population is not obvious. Hence, marginally, a larger level of trade openness has
no clear-cut impact on the trade-off between the marginal benefits of war enjoyed by political leaders and the marginal
costs suffered by the population. Consequently, internal politics do not play a role in our theoretical analysis. Studies
on the relationship between domestic politics and war include Garfinkel (1994) and Hess and Orphanides (1995, 2001).
An alternative model of conflict is offered by Yildiz (2004) in a multi-period bargaining model in which players are
optimistic about their bargaining power but learn as they play the game. He shows that delay in bargaining (which can
be interpreted as war) is possible in such a setup. In such a multi-period model, if war enables the winning country to
appropriate the trade surplus (because it succeeds to impose more favourable terms of trade), the incentive of one country
to attack might increase with trade. Finally, another model of war is offered by Alesina and Spolaore (2005, 2006) where
wars occur because the country attacking has a first strike advantage.
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FIGURE 3
Negotiation under uncertainty
to the equilibrium values (U Wi ,U
W
j ) as determined in the next section. This formalization reflects
the assumption that a country leader has better information on the force of its own military, the
likely destructions in his own country, and the resilience of his citizens in the event of war. The
important assumption in our setup is that a country leader has private information that helps him
form more precise expectations on the fate of his own country in case of war than for the foreign
country. Other sources of uncertainty could be added, but as long they are symmetric between
the two countries, they would not alter our results.
Solving for the second best protocol in bargaining under private information constitutes
one of the most celebrated results in the mechanism design literature (Myerson and Satherwaite,
1983). However, we cannot apply directly Myerson and Satherwaite’s results because they as-
sume that (1) once an agent has agreed to participate in the negotiation, it has no further right
to quit the negotiation table and (2) private information should be independently distributed be-
tween agents. Hereafter, we relax both assumptions because we believe that they are not realistic
in the context of interstate disputes that may escalate in wars.5 First, no institution (even the
United Nations (UN)) has the power to forbid a sovereign country to leave negotiations and enter
war. Hence, the class of protocols we consider, only those with no commitment mechanisms, is
smaller than in Myerson and Satherwaite. Second, it is reasonable to think that in case of war,
the disagreement payoffs are negatively correlated: losses for the winning country (in terms of
territory, national honour, or freedom, for example) partially mirror gains for the other country.
The bargaining problem is depicted in Figure 3. Private information is partially correlated
as (u˜i , u˜ j ) are drawn in a uniform law distributed in the triangle M MA MB where minimum
and maximum values for (u˜i , u˜ j ) are, respectively, −V/2 and +V . Note that it is possible that
5. It is fundamental to relax simultaneously both assumptions. Relaxing the first one only would imply that war
never occurs; indeed in the correlated case with interim participation constraints, Cremer and Mc Lean (1988) have
shown that the first best efficiency can be obtained and players always reach an agreement. Compte and Jehiel (2005)
show that relaxing assumption 2 in order to let agents quit negotiations at any time implies that private information, even
if correlated, results in inefficiency, which in our context translates into possible escalation to war.
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even though peace Pareto dominates war, one country may be better off in the situation of war
than in the situation of peace. This may be interpreted as a case where a war ends up with a
winner.6 Following Compte and Jehiel (2005), we show in Appendix 1 that the bargaining
protocol chosen optimally by the two countries corresponds to a Nash bargaining protocol.
Importantly, with such a protocol, disagreements arise for every outside option (U˜ Wi ,U˜
W
j ) inside
the dashed area AB MA MB , where A and B are such that: M A = 3/4M A′ and M B = 3/4M B ′.
Intuitively, countries do not reach an agreement when the disagreement and agreement pay-
offs are sufficiently close. The reason is that during negotiations, countries do not report their
true outside option. On the one hand, countries have an incentive to announce higher values of
their outside option to extract a larger concession. On the other hand, they have an incentive to
announce lower values in order to secure an agreement and avoid war. When the disagreement
(war) and agreement (peace) payoffs are sufficiently close, the first effect dominates and countries
escalate into war.
The probability of escalation to war corresponds to the surface of AB MA MB divided by the
surface of the triangle M MA MB : Pr(escalationi j ) = 1− M AM BM MA M MB . Assuming that the informa-
tional noise V is not too large, we obtain:
Pr(escalationi j ) = 1− 14V 2
[
(U Pi +U Pj )− (U Wi +U Wj )
]2
U Wi U
W
j
. (3)
The probability of escalation to war increases with the degree of asymmetric information
as measured here by the observational noise V 2 and decreases with the difference in the surplus
under peace and under war, that is the total opportunity cost of war.7 Trade affects both surpluses
as shown in the next section.
2.2. Trade in a multi-country world
Our theoretical framework is based on a standard new trade theory model with trade costs. The
first reason we use such a model is that the multiplicity of trade partners is going to allow coun-
tries to diversify the origin of imports and therefore to decrease dependence on a single partner.
This diversity effect is a natural feature of the Dixit–Stiglitz monopolistic competition model.
Of course, the same results would apply if imperfectly substitutable intermediate goods were re-
quired to produce a final consumption good. The second reason is that distance between countries
plays an important theoretical and empirical role for both trade and war and is relatively easy to
manipulate in new trade models. Importantly, trade is economically beneficial to all countries in
such a model.
The world consists of R countries which produce differentiated goods under increasing
returns. The utility of a representative agent in country i is equal to consumption of a composite
good C made of all varieties produced in the world with the standard Dixit–Stiglitz form:
Ui = Ci =
[ R∑
h=1
nhc
σ−1
σ
ih
] σ
σ−1
, (4)
6. Our setup includes such a possibility, but nothing constrains the war to end up with a clear loser or winner. This
fits well with many military conflicts.
7. Note that we do not allow for spillovers so that the impact of the war between two countries on countries outside
the country pair does not affect negotiations and the probability of escalation. In the model, conflicts outside the country
pair do not affect the probability of escalation of the country pair. Even though we abstract from these spillovers in the
theoretical model, we attempt to control for spatial spillovers in the empirical section.
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where nh is the number of varieties produced in country h, cih is demand in country i for a variety
produced in country h, and σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution. Dual to this is the price index
for each country:
Pi =
( R∑
h=1
nh(ph Tih)1−σ
)1/(1−σ)
, (5)
where ph is the mill price of products made in h and Tih > 1 represents the iceberg trade costs
often used in the trade literature. Those depend on distance and other trade impediments such as
political borders or trade restrictions. If one unit of good is exported from country h to country
i , only 1/Tih units are consumed. In each country, the different varieties are produced under
monopolistic competition and the entry cost requires f units of a freely tradable good which
is chosen as numeraire. Produced in perfect competition with labour only, this sector serves to
fix the wage rate in country i to its labour productivity ai , common to both sectors so that the
marginal cost of production is unity in all countries. This simplifies the analysis as this implies
that wages are not affected by country size, market access, and trade costs. Mill prices in the
manufacturing sector in all countries are identical and equal to the usual mark-up over marginal
cost: pi = σ/(σ −1),∀i . As labour is the only factor of production, and agents are each endowed
with 1 unit of labour, this implies that total expenditure of country i is Ei = Lˆ i , where Lˆi ≡ ai Li
is effective labour, productivity multiplied by Li , the number of workers in country i . The number
of firms is proportional to GDP and set equal to ni = Lˆi/( f σ). The value of imports by country
i from country j then depends on both countries’ incomes, prices, and trade costs:
mi j ≡ n j p j Ti j ci j = Ei E j
(
p j Ti j
Pi
)1−σ
, (6)
a standard gravity equation. At equilibrium, utility increases with trade flows and the number
of varieties and decreases with trade costs:
Ui = σ −1
σ
( f
σ
) −1
σ−1
[ R∑
h=1
n
1
σ
h
(
mih
Tih
) σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
. (7)
We assume that the possible economic effects of a war between country i and country j
are (1) a decrease of λ% in effective labour Lˆi and Lˆ j in both countries (which may come
from a loss in productivity or/and in factors of production); and (2) an increase of τbil% and
τmulti%, in, respectively, the bilateral and the multilateral trade costs Ti j and Tih , h = i, j , on
differentiated goods. During conflicts, borders are closed, transport infrastructures are destroyed,
and confidence is shaken. These can affect both bilateral and multilateral trade costs. Note that
the assumed percentage increase in trade costs due to war is the same across the two fighting
countries, but that the level of initial trade costs between countries differs across country pairs.
To sum up, a country i’s welfare under peace is U Pi = U (xi ), where the vector xi ≡
(Lˆi , Lˆ j ,Ti j ,Tih). Under war, country i’s welfare is stochastic (see equation (2)) but is equal
on average to an equilibrium value U Wi = U [xi (1−)] with:  ≡ (λ,λ,−τbil,−τmulti).
2.3. Trade openness and war
According to our model, the probability of escalation to war between country i and country j is
given by equation (3). Together with equation (7), we show in Appendix 2 that, using a Taylor
expansion around the symmetric equilibrium where countries i and j are identical in size, war
occurs with probability:
Pr(escalationi j ) = 1− 1V 2 [W1λ+ W2τbil + W3τmulti]
2. (8)
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The term in brackets is the total welfare differential between war and peace for both coun-
tries. This differential has three components, which are given in Appendix 2. The first one,
W1 > 0, says that war reduces available resources among belligerents. The negative impact on
welfare comes from the direct impact on wages and income and from the indirect impact on
the number of varieties consumed (locally produced and imported from j). The second compo-
nent, W2 > 0, stands for the fact that war potentially increases bilateral trade costs and consumer
prices and therefore decreases bilateral trade. Similarly, the third component, W3 > 0, stands for
the possible increase of multilateral trade costs, which also generate higher consumer prices.
Importantly, equation (8) can also be rewritten in terms of the observable trade patterns.
For this, we use equation (6) and the national accounting identity: miiEi +
mi j
Ei +
∑R
h = j,i
mih
Ei = 1,
where mii is the value of trade internal to country i and (mi j ,mih) are the observable trade flows
in final goods. We then obtain the probability of escalation as a function of observable bilateral
import flows
(
mi j
Ei
)
and multilateral import flows
(∑R
h = j,i
mih
Ei
)
as ratios of income:
Pr(escalationi j ) = 1− 1V 2

 σλσ −1 + τbil mi jEi −
(
λ
σ −1 − τmulti
) R∑
h = j,i
mih
Ei


2
. (9)
This is the key equation of our model which brings two important implications that are
tested in the empirical section.
Testable implication 1. An increase in bilateral imports of i from j , as a ratio of country i’s
income, decreases the probability of escalation to war between these two countries.
This prediction holds under the condition that τbil > 0: bilateral trade costs increase follow-
ing a war between i and j .8 We test this condition in the empirical section and find that it holds.
If war increases bilateral trade costs, it lowers trade gains the more so, the higher the ex ante
import flows. Hence, observed bilateral trade openness reveals one opportunity cost of a bilateral
war.
Testable implication 2. An increase in multilateral imports (from countries other than j), as
a ratio of country i’s income, implies a higher probability of escalation to war between countries
i and j .
This prediction holds under a stricter condition than the one necessary for Testable impli-
cation 1, namely that: τmulti < λσ−1 , the increase in multilateral trade costs following a war withj is small enough compared to the welfare loss due to the decrease in the number of varieties
consumed that comes from the loss in factors of production of i and j . In the empirical section,
we find that the impact of military conflicts on multilateral trade costs is indeed either small or in-
significant in the post-World War II period. In addition, empirical work by Hess (2004) shows that
economic costs of conflicts are large, which in the context of our model suggests that λ, the per-
centage decrease in effective labour and income, is statistically large. The intuition for Testable
implication 2 is that a high level of multilateral trade reduces the opportunity cost of a conflict
with j : The welfare loss due to the fall in varieties from i and j is lower when internal trade flows
and import flows from j are smaller in proportion of total expenditures, that is, when multilateral
trade openness is large. When τmulti < λσ−1 , observed multilateral openness effectively reduces
the opportunity cost of a bilateral war and the incentive to make concessions in order to avoid
escalation to war. The reason for the possible theoretical ambiguity is that if a bilateral war in-
creases multilateral trade costs to a large extent, then the opportunity cost of a war increases with
observed multilateral trade openness. Note also that a high elasticity of substitution between va-
rieties (σ ) reduces the insurance effect that multilateral trade provides in case of war. The reason
8. The term in the curly brackets in equation (9) is positive because the import-to-income ratio is lower than σ > 1.
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is that in the Dixit–Stiglitz framework, a high elasticity of substitution lowers welfare gains from
diversity. The results for the complements’ case9may differ substantially because multilateral
trade flows would not act as a potential substitute to bilateral flows in this case and (e.g. in the
case of intermediate goods) may actually reverse the impact of multilateral trade on the risk of
war. The case of imperfect substitutability is, however, broadly consistent with the evidence on
the elasticity of substitution between domestically and foreign produced goods in the empirical
trade literature, which routinely produces estimates of those elasticities centred around 8.10
We now discuss the impact of globalization on war. By differentiating equation (8), we
obtain the effect on the probability of escalation of a decrease in bilateral trade barriers Ti j .
Appendix 2 shows that lower bilateral trade costs between i and j decrease the probability
of escalation to war between these two countries: d Pr(escalationi j )d(−Ti j ) < 0. A sufficient condition for
this result to hold is τmulti < λσ−1 . The intuition is similar to Testable implication 1. Under the
same condition, a decrease in trade costs of country i with other countries than country j implies
a higher probability of escalation to war with country j : d Pr(escalationi j )d(−Tih) > 0.
A direct consequence of these two results is that regional and multilateral trade liberaliza-
tion may have very different implications for the prevalence of war. Regional trade agreements
between a group of countries will unambiguously lead to lower prevalence of regional conflicts
but may increase conflicts with other regions. To the opposite, multilateral trade liberalization
may increase the prevalence of bilateral conflicts.
We can use our model to shed light on the following question: Why has the process of
globalization not led to a decrease in the number of military conflicts as was hoped in the begin-
ning of the 1990’s? For simplicity, we assume that the world is made of R identical countries with
symmetric trade barriers, Ti j = T for all i, j . We interpret globalization as a uniform decrease in
trade barriers between all country pairs.
Result 1. Globalization—interpreted as a symmetric decrease in trade costs—increases the
probability of war between all country pairs (see Appendix 2 for proof):
d Pr(escalationi j )
d(−T ) > 0 if
[
λ
σ −1 − τmulti
]
(R −2) > τbil.
This result holds when the increase in multilateral trade costs (τmulti) following a bilateral
conflict is low and when the number of countries (R) is sufficiently large. The reason is that in a
world where countries have a very diverse set of trade partners, globalization reduces the bilateral
economic dependence and the opportunity cost of war for all country pairs. The intuition that
trade is good for peace can actually be reversed. There is an important proviso to this (pessimistic)
message. Multilateral trade liberalization changes the nature of war: It increases the probability of
small-scale wars, but it decreases the probability of a large-scale war. R is the number of countries
in the model but can also be interpreted as the number of coalitions with a dispute that may or
may not escalate into a war. In the limit, when R = 2, globalization unambiguously decreases the
probability of a World War between two coalitions of countries for the same reason that bilateral
trade liberalization induces a lower probability of bilateral war. If one thinks that World Wars are
the most costly in terms of human welfare, then globalization plays a very positive role.
An interesting implication of Result 1 is that it is consistent with graph 2, which suggests
that since World War II, military conflicts have become more local. The probability of a military
conflict between two countries is the probability of a dispute between countries i and j multiplied
9. The case of complements cannot be analysed in our framework of monopolistic competition, which requires an
elasticity of substitution between varieties larger than 1.
10. Using three-digit U.S.–Canada trade and tariff data, Head and Ries (2001) obtain a benchmark estimate of σ =
7·9. With a different methodology, Broda and Weinstein (2006) obtain average estimates of the elasticity of substitution
between 4 and 12·6 for U.S. imports over the 1990–2001 period (table IV).
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by the conditional probability of escalation:
Pr(conflicti j ) = Pr(disputei j )×Pr(escalationi j | disputei j ). (10)
Result 1 implies that the probability of escalation is affected positively by globalization.
The probability of a dispute (which we assume to be independent of globalization) is higher for
proximate countries, a stylized fact well known in political science and that we confirm in the
empirical section. Hence, globalization increases the probability of a military conflict especially
for country pairs with a high probability of dispute, which are typically proximate country pairs.11
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
3.1. Data description on conflicts
Most of the data we use in this paper come from the COW project that makes available (at
http://cow2.la.psu.edu/) a very large array of data sets related to armed conflicts over the last
century. Our principal dependent variable is the occurrence of an MID between two countries.
This data set is available for the years 1816–2001, but we only use the years 1950–2000 because
this is the period for which our principal explanatory variables, bilateral and multilateral trade
over income ratios, are available on a large scale. Each MID is coded with a hostility level ranging
from 1 to 5 (1 = No militarized action, 2 = Threat to use force, 3 = Display of force, 4 = Use
of force, and 5 = War).12 In the COW project, war is defined as a conflict with at least 1000
deaths of military personnel. By this standard, fewer than 100 interstate wars have been fought
since 1815. At the country pair level of analysis, the number of pairs of states at war is naturally
larger, since in multi-state wars, each state on one side would be paired with every state on the
other. Even so, the small number of warring country pairs inhibits the creation of truly robust
estimates of war determinants. Consequently, it is common in the empirical literature to analyse
the causes of MIDs using a broader definition: display of force, use of force, and war itself.
Table A1 in Appendix C describes specific examples of MIDs. Examples of display of force
(level 3 of an MID) include a decision of mobilization, a troop or ship movement, a border
violation, or a border fortification. These are government-approved and unaccidental decisions.
Examples of use of force (level 4 of an MID) include a blockade, an occupation of territory, or
an attack.13 In the rest of this paper, we thus consider MIDi j t to be equal to 1 (and 0 otherwise)
if an MID of hostility level 3, 4, or 5 occurs at date t between countries i and j . We have
also investigated with a hostility level of MID restricted to 4 and 5 and find qualitatively similar
results (see robustness check regressions in Tables 4 and 5). Our sample consists, for each year of
the 1950–2000 period, of all country pair combinations (“dyads”) in existence. Of this universe
of dyads, few are in fact engaged in an MID, even with our enlarged definition. As appears in
Table 1, our universe sample contains 536,381 observations, of which 2390 (0·45%) are engaged
in a military conflict according to our definition. In our preferred specification below (column 4
of Table 3)—where we lose a substantial number of observations due to missing values in the
explanatory variables—this overall war frequency is approximately preserved (1223 conflicts of
223,788 dyads, i.e. 0·55%). The rest of the data sources are described in Appendix 4.
11. To prove this, differentiate equation (10) with respect to T . If, due to globalization, T decreases over time,
and the probability of dispute is itself a decreasing function of distance, then, using Result 1, the probability of conflict
between proximate countries increases with time relative to the one between distant countries.
12. More detail about these data is available in Jones et al. (1996), Faten et al. (2004), and online on the COW
project.
13. We drop the incidents that consist of boat seizures. Political scientists often recommend dropping those inci-
dents, since they mostly concern conflicts related to fishing areas, which are difficult to compare with the other armed
conflicts in our sample. Those boat seizures are relatively infrequent and leaves our main results unaffected.
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TABLE 1
Distribution of conflicts’ intensity over 1950–2000
Full sample Restricted sample
Non-fighting dyads 533,991 222,565
Hostility level of militarized interstate dispute Frequency % Frequency %
3 (Display of force) 455 19·04 280 22·89
4 (Use of force) 1,482 62·01 809 66·15
5 (War) 453 18·95 134 10·96
Total 2,390 100 1,223 100
Note: The restricted sample is from our preferred specification in the first set of regressions (column
4 of Table 3).
3.2. The effect of military conflicts on trade barriers
The first step of our empirical analysis is to assess the impact of past military conflicts on both
bilateral and multilateral trade patterns. The aim of this section is to test the conditions that
bilateral trade barriers increase after a bilateral conflict and that a bilateral conflict has a small
effect on multilateral trade barriers (these are the conditions that enable us to sign the theoretical
impact of trade on the probability of escalation to a military conflict in equation (9)). We therefore
want to evaluate empirically τbil and τmulti, the impact of a military conflict on the levels of
bilateral and multilateral trade barriers.
To do this, note that using equation (6), reintroducing time subscripts, and neglecting con-
stants, we obtain that bilateral imports at time t of country i from country j are an increasing
function of income in the importing country Eit , income in the exporting country E jt , bilateral
trade freeness T 1−σi j t (since σ > 1), and a price index Pit specific to the importing country. While
the rest of equation (6) is relatively straightforward to estimate, this last term is hard to measure
empirically but important theoretically. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) highlight the biases
that can arise when omitting this term and the various solutions to the estimation problem raised
by it. The simplest solution here is to use a convenient feature of the CES demand structure that
makes relative imports from a given exporter independent of the characteristics of third countries.
We can eliminate price indexes in the bilateral trade equation by choosing the imports from the
U.S. as a benchmark of comparison for all imports of each importing country:
mi jt
miut
= E jt
Eut
(
Ti jt
Tiut
)1−σ
, (11)
where the first term of relative productivity-adjusted labour forces is proportional to relative out-
put and the second term involves trade costs of imports of country i from country j relative to
the U.S. (u). Since the price index of the importer does not depend on the characteristics of the
exporter, it cancels out here, which solves the mentioned issue in estimation. The last step is to
specify the trade costs function. Here, we follow the gravity literature in the list of trade costs
components (see Rose, 2004, for recent worldwide gravity equations comparable to our work in
terms of time and country coverage). We separate trade costs between non-policy-related vari-
ables (bilateral distance, contiguity, similarity in languages, and colonial links), policy-related
ones (trade agreements and a communist regime dummy), and those induced by militarized
conflicts, as measured by the vector MIDij:
Ti jt = dδ1i j exp(δ2conti j + δ3langi j +ρ1coli j +ρ2ccoli j
+ρ3rtai j t +ρ4gatti j t +ρ5comi j t +ρ6MIDij), (12)
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where di j is bilateral distance and conti j , coli j , ccoli j , and comi j t are dummy variables indicat-
ing, respectively, whether the two countries have a common border, whether one was a colony
of the other at some point in time, whether the two have been colonized by a same third coun-
try, and whether one is a communist regime. We also account for common membership in a
regional trade area, the rtai j t dummy. A variable counting the number of General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) members in the country pair is
also included. All those variables have been shown in the empirical trade literature to be sig-
nificant predictors of trade flows. The elements of the vector MIDij are the yearly lags and
leads of dummies, indicating the occurrence of an MID. Their exact nature is made clearer
below. Combining equation (12) with equation (11), our variable of interest, the MIDij vector
of dummies, therefore has an effect on trade costs which can be estimated by the following
equation:
ln
(
mi jt
miut
)
= ln
(GDP j t
GDPut
)
+ (1−σ)
[
δ1 ln
( di j t
diut
)
+ δ2(usconti j )+ δ3(uslangi j )
]
+(1−σ)[ρ1(uscoli j )+ρ2(usccoli j )+ρ3(usrtai j )
+ρ4(usgatti j )+ρ5comi j t
]+ (1−σ)ρ6(usMIDij), (13)
where the short cut us designates the fact that all variables are in difference with respect to the
U.S. so that for instance, uslangi j = (langi j − langiu).
3.2.1. Results. We estimate the impact of military conflict on trade both through a tradi-
tional gravity equation, which neglects the price index issue (results are in the first two columns
of Table 2), and with equation (13) that takes into account this concern by considering all vari-
ables (including the conflict variable) relative to the U.S. (results are in the last two columns of
Table 2). All regressions include year dummies (not shown in the regression tables). All estimates
other than the conflict variables, in both sets of results, are reasonably similar to what is usually
found in the literature.14
We allow for the possibility that a military conflict can have contemporaneous as well as
delayed effects on bilateral trade barriers (up to 20 years): In the vector MIDij, this corresponds
to variables bil. MIDi j t − bil. MIDi j t+20. Whether in the traditional gravity equation (column 1)
or in the difference with the U.S. version (column 3), the impact of a bilateral military conflict has
a sizeable impact on bilateral trade. During a military conflict, trade falls by exp(−0·244)−1 
22% relative to the gravity prediction; this effect remains of the same order in the three following
years. When all variables are in difference to the U.S., the impact is larger: The contemporary fall
is about 38% in column (3). We also find that the fall is long lasting as the conflict coefficient is
significant and negative for at least 10 years. These results are in between those found by Morrow
et al. (1998) and Blomberg and Hess (2006) on the one hand and by Glick and Taylor (2005) on
the other hand. The former papers find no statistical significance in the negative effect of military
disputes on bilateral trade in their different specifications (a very reduced-form gravity equation
for Morrow et al., 1998, and a more theory-based one for Blomberg and Hess, 2006). Glick and
Taylor (2005) find a much larger contemporaneous effect in a sample that includes the two World
14. We have checked that the inclusion of the control GDP per capita variable, often introduced in the gravity
literature, but which does not come naturally in our theoretical setup, does not change our results.
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TABLE 2
Impact of militarized interstate dispute on trade
Dependent variables
ln imports lnmi jt/miut
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
ln GDP origin 0·959*** 0·940*** 1·001*** 0·976***
(0·006) (0·007) (0·007) (0·008)
ln GDP destination 0·847*** 0·846*** — —
(0·006) (0·007) — —
ln distance −1·008*** −0·991*** −1·188*** −1·158***
(0·017) (0·019) (0·018) (0·019)
Contiguity 0·452*** 0·412*** 0·663*** 0·680***
(0·075) (0·078) (0·066) (0·069)
Similarity in language index 0·331*** 0·301*** 0·128** 0·112*
(0·070) (0·074) (0·062) (0·065)
Colonial link ever 1·121*** 1·060*** 0·302*** 0·257***
(0·088) (0·093) (0·061) (0·063)
Common colonizer post-1945 0·568*** 0·499*** 0·545*** 0·450***
(0·058) (0·064) (0·063) (0·069)
Preferential trade arrangement 0·545*** 0·539*** 0·441*** 0·426***
(0·049) (0·052) (0·049) (0·053)
Number of GATT/WTO members 0·204*** 0·223*** 0·337*** 0·364***
(0·021) (0·022) (0·034) (0·036)
One communist regime among partners −0·399*** −0·422*** −0·720*** −0·767***
(0·032) (0·034) (0·045) (0·045)
bil. MID + 0 years −0·245*** −0·244*** −0·485*** −0·434***
(0·059) (0·044) (0·036) (0·032)
bil. MID + 1 years −0·213*** −0·238*** −0·417*** −0·340***
(0·047) (0·047) (0·026) (0·028)
bil. MID + 2 years −0·224*** −0·199 *** −0·373 *** −0·287 ***
(0·040) (0·040) (0·028) (0·030)
bil. MID + 3 years −0·245 *** −0·229 *** −0·495 *** −0·472 ***
(0·038) (0·038) (0·026) (0·029)
bil. MID + 4 years −0·162 *** −0·139 *** −0·329 *** −0·327 ***
(0·041) (0·045) (0·026) (0·028)
bil. MID + 5 years −0·021 0·001 −0·196 *** −0·323 ***
(0·034) (0·036) (0·030) (0·034)
bil. MID + 6 years −0·047 −0·018 −0·156 *** −0·097 ***
(0·031) (0·030) (0·022) (0·027)
bil. MID + 7 years −0·024 −0·022 −0·193 *** −0·138 ***
(0·029) (0·032) (0·026) (0·026)
bil. MID + 8 years −0·051 ** −0·067 ** −0·108 *** −0·118 ***
(0·025) (0·029) (0·026) (0·029)
bil. MID + 9 years −0·023 −0·024 −0·082 *** −0·046 **
(0·028) (0·029) (0·023) (0·023)
bil. MID + 10 years −0·045 * −0·060 ** −0·164 *** −0·133 ***
(0·023) (0·027) (0·023) (0·026)
bil. MID + 11 years −0·014 −0·025 −0·077 *** −0·077 ***
(0·026) (0·029) (0·022) (0·024)
bil. MID − 1 years −0·086 ** -0·285 ***
(0·041) (0·030)
bil. MID − 2 years −0·009 −0·214 ***
(0·042) (0·028)
bil. MID − 3 years 0·011 −0·126 ***
(0·044) (0·026)
bil. MID − 4 years −0·033 −0·003
(0·047) (0·024)
bil. MID − 5 years −0·094 −0·105 ***
(0·059) (0·033)
N 300323 244440 286179 231519
R2 0·633 0·622 0·571 0·556
RMSE 1·862 1·845 2·042 2·016
Notes: Columns (1) and (2): simple gravity estimates. Columns (3) and (4): all variables relative to the
U.S. S.E. in parentheses with ***, **, and *, respectively, denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels. Robust S.E. clustered by dyad.
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Wars and only the highest hostility levels for MIDs.15 Anderton and Carter (2001) also find a
negative impact of wars on trade for several pairs of countries.
In columns (2) and (4) of Table 2, we investigate whether trade flows “anticipate” a conflict.
We add dummies for the 5 years preceding the conflict. If those are also negative and significant,
it will point to a common cause that structurally explains why a specific country pair both trades
less than the gravity norm and experiences armed conflicts. In addition, if the coefficient values
increase (in absolute value) as we get closer to the conflict, it might suggest, for example, that
business climate deteriorates between the belligerent countries before the conflict itself. In the tra-
ditional gravity equation, no significant effect can be detected. In the version relative to the U.S.,
the dummies for the 3 years preceding the conflict are negative and significant. We have experi-
mented with the use of Switzerland as an alternative to the U.S. as the reference country. Whereas
other results were similar, the impact of conflict on past trade was insignificant. To summarize,
and after having experienced with many different time windows both backward and forward,
whereas the evidence that trade is affected by the expectation of conflict is mixed, a military
conflict has a large and persistent effect on future trade. The effect lasts between 10 and 20 years.
We also want to investigate the impact of conflicts on total (multilateral) trade. This is done
by inserting in the bilateral trade equation dummies set to 1 when the exporter or the importer
is in conflict with another country than the trade partner. It therefore also gives the impact of
conflicts on overall exports and imports with countries not in the conflict. This regression thus
involves 75 dummies (on top of the year dummies and of the other variables from equation 13):
25 for the bilateral impact and 50 for the multilateral effects (25 for exports and 25 for imports).16
This regression yields our preferred estimates as it accounts for the full set of potential bilateral
and multilateral impacts of a conflict over a long period of time (5 years pre-conflict and 20 years
post-conflict) and deals properly with the price index issue.
Admittedly, the table is difficult to read, and we prefer to represent estimates of interest
graphically, using three different “event-type” figures. Figure 4 shows, using this regression, the
fall of bilateral trade relative to “natural” trade with 5% confidence intervals in grey bands. There
is a significant effect of an upcoming conflict on bilateral trade for the 3 years preceding it. The
effect of a military conflict on contemporaneous trade is large: The coefficient implies a more
than 35% decrease in trade from its natural level. It then decreases in absolute value, and the
fighting country pair recovers a level of trade not statistically different from the norm around the
17th year after the conflict.
In Figure 5, using the same regression, the impacts on multilateral exports and imports are
depicted, respectively. The effect is either not statistically significant, for exports, or negative but
very small, for imports (around 5% when significant). Overall, these empirical results confirm the
validity of the conditions necessary to sign Testable implications 1 and 2 derived in the theoretical
section.
3.3. The impact of trade on MIDs
3.3.1. Empirical strategies. In this section, we test our central theoretical predictions
related to the impact of trade openness on conflicts. Allowing for asymmetry between countries
15. In Glick and Taylor (2005), the treatment of repeated MIDs also tends to increase the contemporaneous effect.
They only consider the latest MID to be relevant in their set of lagged variables. For instance, if a conflict occurs in year
t but another one happened in year t −3, the dummy bil. MIDi j t−3 = 0 in their case, while it is kept equal to 1 in ours.
The method used in Glick and Taylor (2005) will tend to increase the impact of contemporaneous conflicts, since the low
level of trade in year t is partly due to the past conflicts which are not controlled for.
16. This is a simple linear regression with S.E. clustered by dyad. We experimented with a Heckman selection
model to take into account the possibility that zero trade flows in conflict years might affect our estimates (the first stage
being a probit with standard gravity controls and time dummies explaining whether the trade flow is zero or positive).
The impacts of MIDs on both bilateral and multilateral trade are very similar.
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FIGURE 4
The impact of a conflict on bilateral trade
i and j , we use the simple arithmetic average of bilateral import flows over GDP as a measure of
bilateral openness. For multilateral trade openness, we use the arithmetic average of total imports
of the two countries excluding their bilateral imports divided by their GDPs. We then estimate
the probability of MIDi j t between countries i and j at time t with a logit model:
Pr(MIDi j t ) = γ0 +γ1controlsi j t +γ2 ln
(
mi jt
Eit
+ m jit
E jt
)
+γ3 ln

 R∑
h = j,i
miht
Eit
+ m jht
E jt

 . (14)
Equation (9) of our theoretical model predicts γ2 < 0 and γ3 > 0: a negative impact of bilat-
eral trade openness on the probability of MID but a positive impact of multilateral trade openness
on this probability. When estimating equation (14), we face three problems: observability of dis-
putes, endogeneity of trade variables, and measurement error on trade.
1. Cross-sectional variation of disputes:
Equation (9) of our theoretical model generates implications on how the process of escala-
tion of disputes into actual conflicts (MIDs) is affected by trade patterns. This prediction is
not directly testable because the escalation process is not observed in isolation. In our data
set, only the final outcome, MIDs (i.e. MIDi j t = 0 or 1), is observed. The probability that
an MID occurs is the probability of a dispute between countries i and j multiplied by the
conditional probability of escalation. With time subscripts, equation (10) becomes:
Pr(MIDi j t ) = Pr(disputei j t )×Pr(escalationi j t | disputei j t ). (15)
It is therefore essential in our regressions to take into account the cross-sectional varia-
tion of disputes. The estimates will be severely biased if we impose identical coefficients
for all country pairs, whether they have a low probability or high probability of disputes.
There are several determinants of disputes, but the one we will emphasize is bilateral dis-
tance. This seems natural as most interstate disputes are related to disagreements about
borders, ethnic minorities, or religion. This view is supported by our data set: Between
1950 and 2000, the probability of MID is around 5% for countries with a bilateral distance
below 1000 km; this probability drops to countries separated by more than 1000 km. To
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FIGURE 5
The impact of a militarized interstate dispute on multilateral trade
address the issue that not all country pairs have the same probability of disputes, we first
restrict the sample to those country pairs that are most likely to have a high probability of
disputes, namely those with a border and those with a bilateral distance below 1000 km.
This strategy has two drawbacks: The sample is very much reduced and it assumes that,
within the restricted sample, the trade coefficients are constant. Our second and more con-
vincing strategy is to keep the full sample of countries and to add interaction terms between
distance and trade variables, a natural choice given the multiplicative form in equation (15).
Here, we identify our effects on the coefficients of trade and on their interaction terms. If
disputes decrease with distance, we expect a positive sign on the interaction term between
distance and bilateral trade and a negative one for the second interaction term between
distance and multilateral trade.
2. Endogeneity:
The most obvious endogeneity issue relates to the relation between bilateral trade and mil-
itary conflicts. A negative correlation between bilateral trade openness and the probability
of bilateral military conflicts can arise with causality running both ways. Note that for the
relation between multilateral trade openness and the probability of bilateral conflicts, the
issue of reverse causality is not so obvious as we expect a positive impact of multilateral
trade openness on this probability. If anything, bilateral conflicts have a slightly negative
impact on multilateral trade openness (see previous section). We estimate equation (14) in
three different ways in order to deal with endogeneity issues. First, based on results from
the preceding section, we take a 4-year lag for bilateral and multilateral openness variables
in order to limit contemporaneous reverse causality. We also control for several variables
that could be co-determinants of conflicts and trade patterns. It might still be argued that
omitted variables could cause both lagged trade to fall and conflicts to rise over time, even
though the preceding section did not find strong evidence for this. The bias may come for
instance from the fact that some countries (because of cultural, historical, or other reasons
that we cannot fully control for) have good bilateral relations and large trade flows while
also having a low probability of military conflict. In a second set of regressions, we thus
control for such country pair fixed effects by exploiting the panel dimension of our data set.
Last, we implement an instrumental variable strategy in order to control for unobserved,
but time-varying, co-determinants of trade and conflicts.
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3. Measurement error:
Measurement error on bilateral trade data is likely to be non-negligible for countries that
are involved in a military conflict, especially for bilateral trade flows with their opponent.
Lagging by 4 years the trade variables alleviates part of the problem. But it does not fix
it completely because some MIDs may last more than 4 years or may be recurrent: In
that case, bilateral trade is permanently ill measured. Due to such measurement error we
should expect the coefficient of bilateral trade to be biased toward 0. This concern is more
severe in country pair fixed effect regressions than in the cross-sectional logit. Indeed, in
the former, coefficients are identified using time variations of bilateral trade within a given
pair of countries. This is likely to be less accurately measured than the main source of
variation we exploit in the simple logit, namely the variation of bilateral trade between
fighting and non-fighting dyads. Our instrumental variables strategy also helps to alleviate
this measurement error problem.
3.3.2. Results. Table 3 shows both the pooled logit results (first four columns) and the
fixed effects results (last two columns). They pool a very large number of country pairs over
roughly half a century each. The error term is thus likely to exhibit correlation patterns for a
given country pair, and we cluster the (robust) S.E. at the pair level to take this into account.
As is classical in political science, we control for the number of peaceful years (since the last
MID) between the two countries. We also control in all regressions (except those with fixed
effects where all controls that are not time varying are dropped) for bilateral weighted distance
and contiguity between the two countries as they are natural (negative and positive, respectively)
co-determinants of military conflict and trade.
In the first three regressions, we want to present very simple raw estimates of our main
theoretical results. In the first two regressions, we take into account the cross-sectional variation
of disputes by restricting our sample to country pairs with the highest probability of disputes that
could escalate into a military conflict: contiguous pairs (regression 1) and contiguous pairs with a
bilateral weighted distance below 1000 km (regression 2). In this very restricted sample, the signs
on the trade variables are the expected ones even though not significant for multilateral openness
in regression 1. In regression 3, we use the full sample of country pairs but with interaction
terms between distance and trade variables. In this case, all coefficients on the trade variables
(interacted or not) have the expected sign and are significant at the 1% level.
Regression 4 includes a long list of controls that can affect both trade flows and the proba-
bility of military conflicts. We first include year dummies (coefficients unreported) to control for
the overall potential co-evolution of MIDs and international trade over time. We also systemati-
cally control for the temporal autocorrelation in wars by including a set of 20 different dummies
(coefficients unreported) equal to 1 when the country pair was in MID in t −1, t −2, . . . t −20.
This is crucial because we have seen in section 3.2 that the effect of a military conflict on trade
flows can be long lasting. All regressions throughout the rest of the empirical analysis will in-
clude the time dummies and the set of 20 dyadic past war dummies. As an additional control for
temporal autocorrelation in wars, we also consider hereafter a set of 20 different dummies which
code for the fact that the current MID at time t was already active (without any interruption) in
time t −1, t −2, . . . t −20; however, such dummies being perfect predictors of current war, they
cannot be included in our logit specifications and thus are estimated only in our linear specifi-
cations (column 6 in Table 3 and all columns in Tables 6 and 7—coefficients unreported). We
further introduce a dummy for all observations for which trade flows (both exports and imports)
are reported as zero by the IMF (these are not missing values). We view the dummy of zero trade
observations as a control for trade costs interpreted as fixed costs. We also control for the index of
similarity of language, the existence of a preferential trade area, and the number of GATT/WTO
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TABLE 3
Impact of trade on military conflict—I (benchmark results)
Dependent variable: MID
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
ln bil. openness t −4 −0·090 *** −0·127 ** −0·851 *** −0·236 * 0·271 −0·003
(0·032) (0·050) (0·163) (0·132) (0·178) (0·009)
ln mult. openness t −4 0·039 0·275 ** 1·922 *** 1·520 *** 1·315 ** 0·159 ***
(0·106) (0·124) (0·556) (0·451) (0·585) (0·030)
Number of peaceful years − 0·070 *** −0·060 *** −0·067 *** −0·019 *** 0·014 *** 0·002 ***
(0·011) (0·014) (0·006) (0·002) (0·002) (0·000)
ln distance −0·088 0·206 −0·063 −0·835 ***
(0·111) (0·222) (0·220) (0·174)
Contiguity 1·393 *** 1·107 ***
(0·180) (0·171)
ln distance × ln mult. open −0·303 *** −0·189 *** −0·146 * −0·018 ***
(0·075) (0·057) (0·075) (0·003)
ln distance × ln bil. open 0·118 *** 0·038 ** −0·034 0·000
(0·021) (0·017) (0·024) (0·001)
Dummy for zero trade t −4 −0·291 * 0·249 0·002
(0·155) (0·173) (0·004)
UN vote correlation t −4 −0·952 *** −0·610 *** −0·022 ***
(0·142) (0·197) (0·006)
Sum of democracy indexes −0·283 ** −0·136 0·003
(0·116) (0·179) (0·005)
# other wars in t 0·240 *** 0·256 *** 0·035 ***
(0·011) (0·012) (0·001)
ln distance to nearest war in t 0·006 −0·197 ** −0·008 ***
(0·070) (0·095) (0·003)
Sum ln areas 0·159 ***
(0·025)
Alliance active in t 0·092 −0·028 −0·023 **
(0·110) (0·196) (0·011)
Common language 0·243 *
(0·128)
Pair ever in colonial relationship 0·359 *
(0·205)
Common colonizer 0·091
(0·172)
Free trade area (full set) −0·205 −0·066 −0·023 *
(0·170) (0·306) (0·012)
# of GATT members in dyad 0·107 −0·30 * −0·004
(0·081) (0·155) (0·004)
N 7826 4558 223,788 223,788 12,770 223,788
Pseudo-R2 0·175 0·188 0·328 0·547 0·328 0·401
Sample Contiguous Contiguous pairs Full Full Full Full
pairs and <1000 km
Time dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
Dyadic war lags No No No Yes Yes Yes
Dyadic same war lags No No No No No Yes
Estimation method Logit Logit Logit Logit FE logit FE LPM
Notes: S.E. in parentheses with ***, **, and *, respectively, denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Time
dummies and lagged MIDs (20 years) are not reported. Column 1: contiguous country pairs only. Column 2: proximate
countries only. Column 3: full sample with interaction term. Column 4: full sample with interaction term and complete
control set. Column 5: full sample with country pair fixed effects logit model. Column 6: full sample with country pair
fixed effects linear probability model (LPM). S.E. clustered by country pair. MID = militarized interstate dispute.
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members in the country pair. We add a control for country pairs which had a colonial relationship
and a control for those with a common colonizer. We introduce these controls because the empir-
ical trade literature around the gravity equation has shown that they affect trade flows. Because
they are related to the cultural, historical, political, and institutional ties between countries, they
may also affect the probability of military conflicts.
We also add political controls which are possible determinants of MID and which could
be correlated with trade flows. The sum of areas of the two countries (in log) is introduced as
large countries are typically countries with important minorities that can be the source of con-
flicts with neighbouring nations. Large countries may also be more difficult to defend, making
them potential targets to frequent attacks. Larger countries are also naturally less open to trade.
We also control for the political regime. Indeed, the democratic peace hypothesis, which has
been studied by both political scientists and economists (see Levy and Razin, 2004, for a re-
cent explanation of the hypothesis) states that democratic countries are less prone to violence.
But democratic countries are also more open to trade. We control for two (time-varying) mea-
sures of political affinity between countries that may affect both the probability of MID and the
bilateral trade: UN vote correlation (lagged by 4 years) and a dummy for those country pairs
belonging to a military alliance. Finally, it is important to control for the cross-sectional serial
correlation of wars; indeed, the existence of other wars may affect both the probability of a
bilateral war and trade patterns. At the country pair level, we do this in two different ways: by
including the distance to the nearest current war which does not involve a country from the pair
and by including the total number of MIDs (excluding their potential bilateral MID) which the
countries of the pair are involved in at time t . More detail on all data sources is available in
Appendix 4.
With all these controls, regression 4 remains supportive of our theoretical predictions as all
trade variables have the right sign and are significant at the 1% level except the bilateral trade
variable which is significant at the 10% level only. An increase in bilateral openness decreases the
probability of MID but less so for distant countries. A high level of multilateral trade openness
raises the probability of MID mostly for proximate countries. This is consistent with our theoret-
ical framework and suggests that trade patterns (bilateral and multilateral trade openness) affect
more the probability of military conflicts of proximate countries because they mostly affect the
probability of escalation rather than the probability of disputes. Hence, if, as suggested by our the-
ory, globalization increases the probability of escalation for any given pair of countries, it does so
mostly for countries that have a high probability of disputes, that is proximate countries. This, we
argue, may be an explanation for the trend towards more local conflicts as illustrated by Figure 2.
In the next two columns, we replicate specification (4) and add country pair fixed effects.
We do it first with a fixed effect logit specification in which case, only those country pairs that
had a military conflict during the period can be retained. We then proceed with a standard linear
fixed effect specification for which the whole sample can be used. Given the measurement error
issue for bilateral trade of country pairs that have had an MID during the period, these fixed effect
estimations serve mostly to test the impact of multilateral trade on the probability of conflict in
the time dimension. The multilateral trade variable is significant at 5% or 1% in regressions (5)
and (6).
In Tables 4 and 5, we perform numerous robustness checks on our preferred pooled regres-
sion (corresponding to column (4) of Table 3). For the sake of exposition, we report in these
tables only the coefficients of the main variables. In the first column, we restrict the definition
of MIDs to the conflicts of highest intensity (4 and 5), that is those that are characterized by
the use of force and war per se (defined as more than 1000 military deaths). In column (2),
we restrict the definition of MIDs to level 5 conflicts only. In both cases, the trade coefficients
have the same sign as in the benchmark regression. The significance of the bilateral trade
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TABLE 4
Impact of trade on MID—II (robustness checks)
Dependent variable: MID
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5)
ln bil. openness t −4 −0·138 −0·699 * −0·195 −0·214 −0·221 *
(0·155) (0·410) (0·131) (0·133) (0·134)
ln mult. openness t −4 1·181 *** 2·062 ** 1·461 *** 1·536 *** 1·627 ***
(0·414) (1·001) (0·461) (0·451) (0·477)
ln distance × ln mult. open −0·168 *** −0·323 *** −0·181 *** −0·196 *** −0·201 ***
(0·051) (0·119) (0·059) (0·057) (0·061)
ln distance × ln bil. open 0·026 0·062 0·031 * 0·035 ** 0·036 **
(0·021) (0·051) (0·017) (0·017) (0·017)
Security council 0·313 **
(0·159)
Communist regime −0·183
(0·151)
One country is oil exporter 0·609 *
(0·314)
Oil exporter × 60s −0·273
(0·438)
Oil exporter × 70s −0·288
(0·349)
Oil exporter × 80s −0·303
(0·353)
Oil exporter × 90s −0·671 *
(0·362)
Max of primary exports share of GDP 1·170
(0·899)
Primary exports share × 60s −0·592
(1·255)
Primary exports share × 70s −0·453
(0·998)
Primary exports share × 80s −0·798
(0·937)
Primary exports share × 90s −1·261
(0·956)
Time and past war dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 223,788 142,523 223,788 223,788 218,763
Pseudo-R2 0·552 0·674 0·548 0·548 0·55
Notes: S.E. in parentheses with ***, **, and *, respectively, denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Time dummies are not reported as well as the same controls as in column (4) of Table 3. S.E. clustered by dyad.
Column 1: only MIDs of levels 4 and 5. Column 2: only MIDs of level 5. Estimation is by logit on the same sample
as column (4) of Table 3. MID = militarized interstate dispute.
variable decreases due to the more restrictive definition of MID. Note also that when conflicts are
restricted to level 5 only, we lose many observations (around 80,000) because some year dum-
mies are perfect predictors of the absence of war, which implies to drop those years.17 These
results suggest that the definition of MID we adopt throughout the paper (i.e. conflict of inten-
sities 3, 4, and 5) is not a major source of bias in our estimates. In regression (3) we add a
dummy for “major powers” which we define as those five countries (U.S., U.K., France, China,
and Russia) endowed with a permanent seat in the UN’s Security Council. We also add dummies
for communist countries as we know that these regimes have been less opened to trade over our
17. In unreported regressions available on request, we reduce the number of time dummies and replace the yearly
time dummies by dummies indicating 2-year periods in order to keep more observations. The coefficients of interest are
almost unaffected.
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TABLE 5
Impact of trade on wars—III (robustness checks continued)
Dependent variable: war between two countries
Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) Model (10) Model (11)
ln bil. openness t −4 −0·231 * −0·205 −0·206 −0·246 −0·233 * −0·236 *
(0·133) (0·141) (0·135) (0·152) (0·136) (0·135)
ln mult. openness t −4 1·466 *** 1·348 *** 1·612 *** 1·340 *** 1·431 *** 1·520 ***
(0·457) (0·434) (0·473) (0·492) (0·466) (0·449)
ln distance × ln mult. open −0·183 *** −0·166 *** −0·199 *** −0·185 *** −0·179 *** −0·189 ***
(0·058) (0·053) (0·060) (0·059) (0·059) (0·056)
ln distance × ln bil. open 0·037 ** 0·036 ** 0·036 ** 0·038 ** 0·038 ** 0·038 **
(0·017) (0·018) (0·018) (0·017) (0·018) (0·018)
Trade sanctions t −4 0·228
(0·159)
ln sum (gdp per cap) t −4 −0·002
(0·085)
ln abs. diff (gdp per cap) t −4 −0·043
(0·054)
ln abs. diff (gdp per cap) t −4 squared 0·006
(0·008)
ln military expenditures t −4 0·021
(0·031)
Difference in ln military expenditures t −4 −0·068 **
(0·027)
ln bil. openness × 60s −0·039
(0·071)
ln bil. openness × 70s 0·002
(0·068)
ln bil. openness × 80s 0·032
(0·063)
ln bil. openness × 90s 0·003
(0·057)
ln mult. openness × 60s 0·290
(0·183)
ln mult. openness × 70s 0·034
(0·213)
ln mult. openness × 80s 0·203
(0·185)
ln mult. openness × 90s 0·146
(0·223)
Time and past war dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 223,788 222,559 212,831 223,788 205,907 223,788
Pseudo-R2 0·548 0·552 0·548 0·548 0·549 0·547
Notes: S.E. in parentheses with ***, **, and *, respectively, denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Robust
S.E. clustered by dyad. Estimation is by logit on the same sample as column (4) of Table 3. Time dummies are not
reported as well as the same controls as in column (4) of Table 3. Column (10): sample restricted to dyads with at least
30 years of data. Column (11): multi-way clustering by dyad and year following the Cameron et al. (2006) method.
sample period. The trade results are not driven by either group. In column (4), we add a dummy
if one of the two countries is an oil exporting country as defined by the IMF in the DOTS data
set. The reason is that oil exporting countries may be more open to trade and also more prone to
conflicts to defend these resources. Hence, these countries may drive our results on multilateral
trade. Also, to control for changes in oil prices that may affect trade openness of these countries
as well as their propensity to enter in conflicts, we include interaction dummies between the oil
exporter dummy and decades. As expected, oil exporting countries are more often involved in
conflicts, but the multilateral trade variable remains significant at the 1% level. In column (5),
we perform the same exercise but we use the highest share of primary goods’ exports in the GDP
of the country pair. We obtain similar results. In regression (6) of Table 4, we add a dummy that
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designates those country pairs for which trade sanctions (lagged 4 years) are reported by Elliot
et al. (2005). These authors show that trade sanctions lead to a substantial decrease in trade. Such
sanctions also reflect bad political relations between countries which can escalate into conflicts.
Hence, the negative effect of bilateral trade on conflicts could be spurious and generated by the
effect of trade sanctions on trade that would also predict future conflicts. The effects of bilateral
and multilateral trade openness remain robust. In regression (7), we control for the level and dif-
ference in GDP per capita within a pair of countries as well the square of this difference so as to
allow for non-linearity in the relation. If richer countries are more open to trade and are also more
prone to warfare, then our positive link between multilateral trade openness and the probability
of conflict could be spurious. This does not seem to be the case. In regression (8), we control
for military expenditures as countries at war may import more weapons which may explain the
positive sign on multilateral trade in our regression. We do not have data on trade in weapons, but
military expenditures should proxy for this. We add controls for the log of the sum of the level
of reported military expenditures and the log of the difference of military expenditures. In this
specification, the multilateral trade coefficient remains significant at the 1% level. In regression
(9), we add interaction terms between our two trade variables and decade dummies. We do this
to check whether our results are driven by a specific period in our sample such as the decoloniza-
tion, the Cold War, or the end of the Cold War. The results suggest that no specific decade drives
our results. In regression (10), we restrict the sample to those countries with at least 30 years
of data. The results again are robust. Finally, column (11) reports results using a new technique
for the clustering of the error terms. All other columns report S.E. with a dyadic-level clustering,
which is a standard option in the econometric package we use (Stata). It might be argued that—in
addition to the dyadic dimension—there could remain serial autocorrelation of errors within time
periods. This calls for multi-way clustering for both dyad and year separately but in the same
regression. Because these clusters are not nested, this is a more complicated problem than the
one-way clustering. A very recent paper by Cameron et al. (2006) proposes a multi-way cluster-
ing method, which involves re-computing the correct variance–covariance matrix out of the ones
obtained from different one-way clustering regressions (see their paper and in particular pages
12–13 for the binary dependent variable case). We implement their method in our benchmark
regression and observe that the S.E. hardly change at all. Practically, in our sample, the dyadic
one-way clustering is by far the most important adjustment. Overall, we interpret these results as
very supportive of our theoretical predictions. The result of a positive impact of multilateral trade
openness on the probability of conflict is very robust. The negative impact of bilateral trade on
the probability of conflict is somewhat less robust in terms of statistical significance, although the
magnitude of the coefficient is very stable. We interpret this as a problem of measurement errors
that certainly plague bilateral trade data for country pairs that experience military conflicts. The
instrumental variable strategy that we implement in Section 3.5 is partly meant to address this
issue.
3.4. Quantification
We now want to quantify the magnitude of the effect of trade on the probability of military conflict
between two countries. First, note that since our principal variables of interest are in logs, each
coefficient is a very close approximation of the elasticity of war probability with respect to a
change in the considered variable from a given start value, for instance the mean or median.18
18. The exact formula for this elasticity is β(1− P¯), where β is the obtained coefficient and P¯ is the war probability
given by the logit formula. A natural thought experiment is to consider P¯ to be the probability when all variables are at
their average or median values (typically a very small figure in our case).
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The interpretation of coefficients in terms of economic magnitude is, however, here made difficult
by the terms interacting openness with distance. As emphasized by Ai and Norton (2003), the
non-linear nature of logit estimation makes it impossible to make the usual linear adjustment to
coefficients for different levels of distance.19
In order to judge whether our results are quantitatively important, we therefore follow a
different approach. Using the estimates from our preferred regression (4 in Table 3), we simulate
the effect of changes in different variables, holding everything else constant, on the predicted
probability of conflict obtained from the logit model. Of particular interest for us is the following
counterfactual: What would happen to probabilities of conflict should the countries come back
to the level of bilateral and multilateral openness they had at the start of the current globalization
phase? We therefore calculate the predicted probabilities of war for our benchmark model in the
year 2000 and then compute the same probabilities when the different trade variables are brought
back to their level of 1970. These different probabilities are then averaged over four groups of
countries depending on their bilateral distance: less than 1000 km, between 1000 and 2000 km,
between 2000 and 5000 km, and more than 5000 km.
Results are depicted in Figure 6. The baseline average probability of a military conflict
in 2000 is 4·46% for countries separated by a bilateral distance shorter than 1000 km. For the
second bar, we simulate the effect of bringing the level of bilateral trade openness back to its
1970 level (while all other variables are kept at their 2000 level). The average conflict prob-
ability would increase to 4·81%. In the case of multilateral trade openness, the return to the
1970 level would lower the probability of a military conflict to 3·41% (the third bar). The ef-
fects for the most proximate countries are therefore estimated to be quite large. Even though
it is interesting to quantitatively disentangle the two effects of bilateral and multilateral trade,
the globalization process is by construction an increase in both bilateral and multilateral trade
flows. Hence, the overall net effect is the one that we want to focus on: This is shown in the
fourth bar which suggests that the globalization process between 1970 and 2000 has increased
the probability of a military conflict between two proximate countries from 3·67% to 4·46%, an
increase of 21%. This is surprisingly large for this group of countries. However, note first that
the effects are much smaller for countries with higher bilateral distance (the next three blocks
of columns in Figure 6). In addition, the increase in trade openness is itself large during this
period for the median country pair of this short-distance group: 154% for the bilateral trade
openness ratio and 60% for the multilateral trade openness ratio in our sample. For comparison
purposes, the last bar of each group shows the marginal effect (on the probability of conflict in
2000) of adding 20 peaceful years in the bilateral political relationship. In terms of its effect
on the probability of a military conflict, 30 years of globalization has roughly had the same ef-
fect as eliminating 20 years of peace in the bilateral relation between proximate countries. Note
finally that the empirical finding that the net effect of 30 years of globalization has been to in-
crease the probability of a bilateral military conflict is consistent with Result 1 of the theoretical
section.
For countries with a bilateral distance between 1000 and 2000 km, the effects are qualita-
tively similar but quantitatively much smaller. They become extremely small for countries with
a bilateral distance larger than 2000 km. That the impact of trade patterns on the probability of
conflicts decreases with distance is consistent with our theoretical framework. It is also consis-
tent with the increased “localization” of military conflicts as illustrated by Figure 2. Hence, we
conclude that 30 years of globalization has significatively increased the probability of military
conflicts during this period but only for proximate countries for which the probability of a dispute
is the highest.
19. We thank Harry Bowen for pointing out this issue.
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FIGURE 6
Quantifying the impact of bilateral and multilateral trade on conflicts
3.5. Instrumental variables
In this section,20 we implement an instrumental variable strategy to control for potential endo-
geneity of trade as an explanation of armed conflicts. Given that there are two potentially endoge-
nous variables (bilateral and multilateral trade openness), the objective is to find two time-varying
instruments that impact trade flows but are not affected directly by the bilateral relation of two
countries for which we want to estimate the probability of an MID. These two instruments are
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and an index of economic remoteness of the two
countries.
The GSP, which consists of schemes of tariff preferences granted by developed countries
to developing countries, is well fitted for our purpose. It facilitates access of least developed
countries (LDCs) to markets of rich countries.21 The first GSP schemes were implemented by
the European Economic Community and Japan in 1971 and by the U.S. in 1976; the number of
beneficiary countries rose dramatically in the 1980’s and early 1990’s. All GSP schemes provide
tariff concessions on a wide range of products. GSP programmes resulted in a substantial increase
in LDCs’ trade (for empirical evidence, see Baldwin and Murray, 1977; Rose, 2004; Romalis,
2003). LDCs’ eligibility to GSP programmes is primarily based on their level of poverty. In par-
ticular, there is no official condition imposed on the beneficiary country’s propensity to enter into
military conflicts. This last point is crucial to our instrumentation strategy: A valid instrument
should have no direct relationship with the dependent variable (conflicts here). Despite these offi-
cial rules, GSP participation might in reality be linked to political objectives of granting countries.
20. We thank Jean-Marc Robin for his numerous suggestions and comments on this section.
21. A detailed analysis of GSP schemes can be found in Romalis (2003) and UNCTAD (2003).
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It is possible that political ties between the two countries affect what remains a discretionary de-
cision by the rich country.22 Nevertheless, regarding the validity of our instrument, what matters
is the fact that GSP participation has no causal link with the beneficiary country’s conflicts with
countries different from the one granting the programme. This is the reason why in the follow-
ing, we exclude from the sample those countries (U.S., Japan, European Union (EU) members,
New Zealand, Australia, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria) that have at some point granted a GSP
programme. We define our instrumental variable in the following way: For each country pair, we
count the number of recipients of a European GSP programme and multiply this number by the
combined proximity to the EU (the city of Brussels). We choose the European scheme because
(1) it was the first to be implemented in 1971, (2) U.S. or Japanese schemes are less powerful
instruments, and (3) there was no unified foreign policy at the European level; hence, it is hard to
believe that the EU GSP scheme is used by the different members for their own foreign policy.
We include the interaction with proximity to the EU because the effects of a GSP given by the
EU on the trade structure are larger for nearby countries. We lag this instrumental variable by 8
years, which leaves time for the GSP programme to produce its effect on the trade structure of
recipient countries at date t −4. For pairs of countries including a GSP recipient, we expect that
the improved access to a rich and distant market is likely to exert a positive shock to multilateral
trade while we expect no obvious effect on bilateral trade.
The second instrumental variable is a country pair measure of the economic remoteness to
the rest of the world. This variable is routinely used in the international trade literature as one
of the determinants of trade flows (Baier and Bergstrand, 2004, is a recent example). Intuitively,
remoteness is an inverse measure of each importer’s set of alternative sourcing countries for their
imports. Due to decreased competition from the rest of the world, a pair of countries with few
nearby and large alternative sources of goods (a remote pair) will alter the geographical structure
of its trade through a relative increase of its bilateral imports with respect to its multilateral
imports. Following the literature, our definition of the remoteness variable is:
remotenessi j t = − ln

 R∑
k = j,i
GDPkt
dik
+
R∑
k = j,i
GDPkt
d jk

 . (16)
When building the remoteness variable, we exclude any third country k which has been at
war with one of the members (i , j) of the country pair at any moment in history. We also lag
the variable by 4 years. The main interest of the remoteness variable is that it varies in the time
dimension because of the relative GDP growth of countries outside the country pair; therefore, it
is not affected by the bilateral relation of the two countries (i , j) for which we want to estimate
the probability of MID. An increase in remoteness should tend to raise bilateral trade openness
with respect to multilateral trade openness of the two countries.
We include country pair fixed effects and year dummies in all our instrumental variables
(IV) regressions. Indeed, the purely geographical part of the remoteness index is time invariant
and could be linked to the propensity to experience military conflicts. Controlling for country pair
fixed effects eliminates this source of endogeneity.23 Furthermore, controlling for year dummies
22. From this perspective, a look at the history of the U.S. GSP scheme is instructive: (1) most communist countries
were excluded from the U.S. scheme until the end of the Cold War and (2) while most suspensions from the U.S. pro-
gramme involve countries that in fact reached a high enough level of development (e.g. Hong-Kong, Singapore, and
South Korea in 1989 and Israel in 1995), there are several cases involving bad political relations between the beneficiary
country and the U.S. (e.g. Nicaragua in 1985, Paraguay in 1987, and Chile in 1988).
23. Another (relatively) time-invariant source of endogeneity is that poor countries, which are the only beneficiaries
of GSP programmes, could be intrinsically more prone to war. Note, however, that in regression (7) of Table 4, the level
and difference in GDP per capita have no significant effect on the probability of an MID.
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is important since the GSP schemes were mostly implemented during the 1970’s. We want, in this
demanding specification, to be able to identify variation of conflictuality and trade patterns within
country pairs over time, while controlling for an overall worldwide trend in the war probability.
Using instrumental variables’ methods is not straightforward in our case since no standard
estimation technique is readily available with a fixed effect logit estimation. Furthermore, such
technique would, as noted for regression (5) of Table 3, imply to throw away the vast majority
of informative observations where no conflict arises in our time frame. We follow one of the
solutions provided by Wooldridge (2002), which is simply to use a fixed effects linear probability
model.
Another concern is that medium-run political cycles (e.g. the rise of nationalism) could
affect both the trade regime and the interventionist nature of governments. To deal with this
potential source of endogeneity, we also present longer run tests where all variables (including
time dummies and the MID variable) are lumped by decade. This enables to filter out the spurious
effects of such political cycles on the correlation between trade flows and MID.
Finally, in some of our instrumented specifications, we “compact” the bilateral and multilat-
eral trade openness variables into one single trade variable, which is expected to have a positive
impact on the probability of a bilateral MID according to our theory. This variable is the country
pair geographical trade structure, that is the log of the ratio of multilateral over bilateral open-
ness. We expect GSP schemes to exert a positive shock and economic remoteness, a negative one
on the country pair structure of trade. The benefit of this procedure is that it allows to perform an
overidentification test since there are now two instruments for only one endogenous explanatory
variable.
Table 6 shows the first-stage regressions where, as before, coefficients on dummies for time
and past conflicts are not reported. The first two columns correspond to the instrumentation of
bilateral and multilateral trade flows, respectively. The instruments do not suffer from statisti-
cal weakness as the coefficients of interest are highly significant in three of the four cases and
the F-tests on the joint null effect of IVs reject the hypothesis and exceed the threshold of 10
recommended by Staiger and Stock (1997). As expected, the GSP has a positive impact on mul-
tilateral trade and no significant impact on bilateral trade. Remoteness has a positive impact on
bilateral trade and, surprisingly, a positive impact on multilateral trade. However, the coefficient
for multilateral trade is smaller than the coefficient for bilateral trade, confirming that the ex-
pected effect of remoteness is to re-balance the geographical structure of trade from multilateral
to bilateral openness. This interpretation is confirmed in the third column, which reports the first
stage for our “compact” measure of trade structure (multilateral over bilateral trade). In this case,
remoteness is the only powerful instrument. It has the expected sign. In the last three columns,
the first stage for the bilateral, multilateral, and trade structure variables are presented when we
use the decade lumping procedure. In this case, all the instruments have the expected sign and
are somewhat less powerful, although the F-tests still pass Staiger and Stock’s (1997) threshold.
Table 7 shows the second stage of our instrumented regressions. Column (1) provides bench-
mark results for the non-instrumented regression on the sample where all country pairs involving
donor countries are excluded. The results are close to those obtained with country pair fixed ef-
fects on the full sample—see regression (6) of Table 3. Column (2) shows the results for the
instrumented regression where all trade variables have the right sign and are significant at the
1% level. While the coefficient for multilateral trade remains quite stable, the one for bilateral
trade is quite different from its value found in the non-instrumented specification of column
(1); this confirms our view that endogeneity bias and measurement error are more a source of
concern for bilateral trade than for multilateral trade. In columns (3) and (4), we present the non-
instrumented and the instrumented regressions, respectively, when the explanatory variable is the
geographical structure of trade; results are similar and supportive of our predictions. In this case,
c© 2008 The Review of Economic Studies Limited
892 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
TABLE 6
Impact of trade on wars—first-stage IV regressions
Dependent variable
Yearly trade Average trade by decade
bil. mult. mul./bil. bil. mult. mul./bil.
Model (a) Model (b) Model (c) Model (d) Model (e) Model (f)
GSP IV 0·033 0·049 *** 0·016 0·228 ** 0·124 *** −0·105
(0·025) (0·007) (0·023) (0·131) (0·039) (0·110)
Remoteness IV 0·653 *** 0·103 *** −0·550 *** 0·299 *** −0·133 *** −0·431 ***
(0·033) (0·013) (0·031) (0·066) (0·026) (0·066)
Dummy for zero trade t −4 −41·836 *** −0·018 *** 1·818 *** −2·719 *** −0·040 *** 2·679 ***
(0·014) (0·004) (0·014) (0·049) (0·015) (0·049)
# of peaceful years −0·005 *** −0·001 *** 0·004 *** −0·009 *** −0·001 0·009 ***
(0·001) (0·000) (0·001) (0·002) (0·001) (0·002)
UN vote correlation −0·015 −0·172 *** −0·156 ***
(0·021) (0·008) (0·021)
Sum of democracy indexes 0·082 *** 0·048 *** −0·034 ** 0·206 *** 0·147 *** −0·059
(0·014) (0·004) (0·013) (0·040) (0·014) (0·039)
# other wars in t −0·013 *** 0·001 0·014 *** −0·064 *** −0·002 0·062 ***
(0·002) (0·000) (0·002) (0·008) (0·002) (0·007)
ln distance to nearest war in t −0·003 −0·008 *** −0·005 0·172 *** 0·034 *** −0·138 ***
(0·008) (0·002) (0·008) (0·036) (0·012) (0·036)
Alliance active in t 0·166 *** 0·074 *** −0·092 *** 0·410 *** 0·223 *** −0·187 *
(0·034) (0·012) (0·034) (0·097) (0·042) (0·098)
# of GATT members in pair 0·169 *** 0·084 *** −0·085 *** 0·043 0·077 *** 0·034
(0·011) (0·003) (0·011) (0·028) (0·010) (0·028)
Free trade area (full set) 0·608 *** 0·016 ** −0·592 *** 1·152 *** −0·025 −1·177 ***
(0·023) (0·007) (0·023) (0·070) (0·025) (0·069)
UN vote correlation 0·103 −0·20 *** −0·303∗∗∗
(0·070) (0·027) (0·068)
F-test on IVs 197·44 61·92 156·12 11·93 16·82 22·1
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dyadic war lags Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dyadic same war lags Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 161528 161528 161528 25034 25034 25034
Within-R2 0·194 0·189 0·189 0·323 0·266 0·319
RMSE 1·249 0·361 1·239 1·025 0·371 1·004
Notes: S.E. in parentheses with ***, **, and *, respectively, denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. All
columns show first-stage IV within estimates with dyadic fixed effect. All regressions (as in the second stage of IV
estimation) include unreported time dummies, 20 lags of dyadic war, and 20 lags of dyadic same-war dummies. The first
three columns present, respectively, results on bilateral trade, multilateral openness, and the trade structure ratio with
annual variation. The last three columns present the same results when the variables are averaged by decade. Columns
(a) and (b) present first-stage estimates of column (2) in Table 7. Columns (d) and (e) present first-stage estimates of
column (6) in Table 7. Columns (c) and (f) present first-stage estimates of columns (4) and (8), respectively, in Table 7.
we can perform a Sargan test for overidentification; the test reveals a statistic of 0·001, which
corresponds to a P-value of 0·97, stating that the exogeneity hypothesis on our instruments
cannot be rejected. In the last four columns, we replicate the same exercise using the lumping
procedure by decade.24 The results are remarkably stable and robust. All trade variables have
the expected sign and are significant both in the benchmark regressions and in the IV ones.
The usual rise in S.E. in IV estimates explains that the IV estimate for the multilateral trade
variable is significant at the 10% level only. In terms of the Sargan overidentification test relative
to the specification with trade structure in column (8), the statistic is 0·006 with a P-value of 0.94
comparable to the non-lumped case of column (4).
24. Those specifications with lumped variables (suggested by a referee) are extremely demanding because they
include country pair fixed effects and therefore identify all coefficients along the time dimension which now has at most
five observations by dyad (i.e. five decades).
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4. CONCLUSIONS
Our paper is the first, to our knowledge, to highlight the opposite effects of bilateral and multi-
lateral trade on the probability of war and to base the empirical analysis on testable predictions
generated by a theoretical model. We have shown that even in a model where trade increases
welfare and war is Pareto dominated by peace, higher trade flows may not lead to more peaceful
relations. Indeed, what matters ultimately is the geographical structure of trade and its balance
between bilateral and multilateral openness. Bilateral trade, because it increases the opportunity
cost of bilateral war, deters bilateral war. Multilateral trade openness, because it reduces this
opportunity cost with any given country, weakens the incentive to make concessions during ne-
gotiations to avert escalation and therefore increases the probability of war between any given
pair of country. From this point of view, an increase in trade between two countries pacifies rela-
tions between those but increases the probability of conflict with third countries. Our econometric
analysis validates this prediction using a large number of alternative specifications and empirical
strategies. Trade globalization also affects the nature of war: Multilateral openness increases the
probability of local wars but should deter global conflicts. This last point, a logical consequence
of our results but that we cannot test directly, is important. Given that these conflicts are certainly
the most costly in terms of human welfare, this is not a small achievement.
Our model and empirical results also suggest that regional and bilateral trade agreements
which foster regional and bilateral trade flows may have positive consequences for political re-
lations. The positive political implications of these agreements may become even more impor-
tant as multilateral trade flows increase. Hence, a possible extension is to focus on the impact
of regional trade agreements on the probability of war and in particular to better understand
which features of trade agreements are peace promoting. This could provide an assessment of
whether regional trade agreement, allowing for an increase in regional trade, is enough to aug-
ment peace prospects or whether countries should be tied further by institutional and political
ties. Other extensions include the impact of globalization on information flows and through
this channel on the probability of war. A recent literature in trade (Rauch, 1999) has argued
both theoretically and empirically that trade in differentiated products (as opposed to homo-
geneous products traded anonymously) should generate more interactions between traders and
therefore more information flows. Hence, one could more precisely test the impact of trade on
war through the information channel by following Rauch’s distinction between differentiated and
homogeneous products. A related extension would be to analyse the case where goods of differ-
ent countries are complements rather than imperfect substitutes (e.g. in the case of intermediate
inputs). This would change some results of the theoretical section as multilateral trade openness
may in this case diminish the probability of escalation into a bilateral conflict. This possibility
would need to be tested by distinguishing trade flows according to the degree of substituability
of goods, and this would constitute an additional way to test the mechanisms at work in our
story.
APPENDIX A. SOLVING FOR THE SECOND BEST PROTOCOL
This section derives the second best mechanism of our bargaining game under asymmetric information. To this purpose,
we rely on Myerson–Satherwaite (denoted M-S) and provide a two-stage proof which follows Compte and Jehiel (2005).
First, we study the equilibrium of a particular protocol, the so-called Nash bargaining protocol. We then show that this
protocol implements the second best mechanism.
Remember that our setup differs from the M-S setup as (1) at any time, countries may quit negotiations and (2)
private information is partially correlated between countries: the outside options are uniformly distributed on the triangle
	=(M, MA, MB ) (see Figure 3).
	 =
{
(U˜ Wi ,U˜
W
j ) | (U˜ Wi ,U˜ Wj ) ≥
(
vi ,v j
)
and U˜ Wi + U˜ Wj ≤ v¯
}
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with vi ≡ (1 − V/2)U Wi and v j ≡ (1 − V/2)U Wj and v¯ = (1 + V )(U Wi + U Wj ). From assumption (1), peace Pareto
dominates war, meaning that v¯ < S P ≡ U Pi + U Pj . In the rest of the section, for the sake of expositional clarity, we
assume without loss of generality25 that V = 2 such that vi = v j = 0.
A.1. The Nash bargaining protocol
The Nash bargaining protocol was first described in a slightly different setting by Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983). This
is a two-stage protocol.
• Announcement stage: In the first stage, both countries i and j announce an outside option (Uˆ Wi ,Uˆ Wj ), and a
sharing rule is proposed.
If the announcements are compatible, that is, if the sum Uˆ Wi + Uˆ Wj ≤ S P , an agreement is proposed along
with transfers τi (Uˆ Wi ,Uˆ
W
j ) and τ j (Uˆ
W
i ,Uˆ
W
j ) chosen so that each party obtains, in addition to its announced
outside option, half the surplus S P − (Uˆ Wi + Uˆ Wj ) that is:
τi (Uˆ Wi ,Uˆ
W
j ) = Uˆ Wi +
S P − (Uˆ Wi + Uˆ Wj )
2
and τ j (Uˆ Wi ,Uˆ
W
j ) = Uˆ Wj +
S P − (Uˆ Wi + Uˆ Wj )
2
.
In case the announcements are not compatible, Uˆ Wi + Uˆ Wj > S P , the bargaining process stops, war is triggered,
and each party gets its (true) outside option (U˜ Wi ,U˜ Wj ).
• Agreement stage: In the second stage, parties sequentially report if they accept the deal.26 If both parties say
“yes,” the deal is implemented. Otherwise, negotiation stops, war is triggered, and each party gets its (true)
outside option (U˜ Wi ,U˜
W
j ).
Clearly, in the second stage, it is a dominant strategy for each party k ∈ (i, j) with true outside option U˜ Wk to
say “yes” (respectively, “no”) if τk ≥ U˜ Wk (respectively, τk < U˜ Wk ). From Compte and Jehiel (2005), we are able to
characterize the equilibrium of the outside option announcement game:27
Lemma 1. At equilibrium, a party k ∈ {i, j} with (true) type U˜ Wk announces Uˆ Wk = a(U˜ Wk ), where
a(U˜ Wk ) =
1
4
S p + 2
3
U˜ Wk .
Consequently, there is an agreement and peace is maintained when U˜ Wi +U˜ Wj ≤ 34 S P . War occurs for U˜ Wi +U˜ Wj >
3
4 S
P . In Figure 3, disagreement arises for every couple of outside options which are located in the AB MB MA dashed
area.
Proof of Lemma 1. The expected gain of player i with type U˜ Wi when announcing Uˆ Wi is
G(U˜ Wi ,Uˆ
W
i ) =
∫ S p − Uˆ Wi +a(U˜ Wj )
2
> U˜ Wj max

Uˆ Wi , S
p − Uˆ Wi −a
(
U˜ Wj
)
2

 dU˜ Wj
v¯−U˜ Wi
+U˜ Wi
∫ S p − Uˆ Wi +a(U˜ Wj )
2
< U˜ Wj
dU˜ Wj
v¯−U˜ Wi
.
We now check that it is optimal for party i to announce Uˆ Wi = a(U˜ Wi ). Given the form of a(·), it is readily verified
that whenever the announcements are compatible, that is a(U˜ Wi ) + a(U˜ Wj ) < S p, we have a(U˜ Wk ) > U˜ Wk for both
25. In Figure 3, assuming V = 2 means that M corresponds to the origin (0,0).
26. This stage corresponds to our assumption of “no commitment protocol”. In the original approach, this stage is
not allowed: The parties agree ex ante on the sharing rule; they cannot ex post renegotiate.
27. In the general case of V < 2, the formula becomes more complicated. Indeed, a straightforward variable change
shows that in equilibrium, a party k ∈ {i, j} with (true) type U˜ Wk announces Uˆ Wk = a(U˜ Wk ), where a(U˜ Wk )= vk + 14 (S p −
vi − v j )+ 23 (U˜ Wk − vk ). Consequently, there is an agreement and peace is maintained when (U˜ Wi + U˜ Wj − vi − v j ) ≤
3
4 (S
P − vi − v j ). War occurs for (U˜ Wi + U˜ Wj − vi − v j ) > 34 (S P − vi − v j ).
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k ∈ {i, j}. Hence, the Nash bargaining share of each party k is above U˜ Wk . This allows to simplify the expression
of G(U˜ Wi ,Uˆ
W
i ) when Uˆ
W
i lies in the neighbourhood of a(U˜
W
i ) in:
G(U˜ Wi ,Uˆ
W
i ) =
∫
a
(
Uˆ Wj
)
< S p − Uˆ Wi
S p + Uˆ Wi −a
(
Uˆ Wj
)
2
dU˜ Wj
v¯−U˜ Wi
+U˜ Wi
∫
a
(
Uˆ Wj
)
> S p − Uˆ Wi
dU˜ Wj
v¯−U˜ Wi
.
Differentiating G(U˜ Wi ,Uˆ
W
i ) with respect to Uˆ
W
i yields:
∂G
(
U˜ Wi ,Uˆ
W
i
)
∂Uˆ Wi
= 1
v¯−U˜ Wi

 b
(
S p − Uˆ Wi
)
2
−
(
Uˆ Wi − U˜ Wi
)
b′
(
S p − Uˆ Wi
) ,
where b(x) ≡ − 38 S p + 32 x is the inverse of function a(.). Straightforward computations show that
∂G
(
U˜ Wi ,Uˆ
W
i
)
∂Uˆ Wi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Uˆ Wi =a
(
U˜ Wi
) = 0. ‖
A.2. Second best
We now show that the Nash bargaining protocol described in the previous section implements the second best. From M-S
(1983), we know that when outside options are uniformly distributed on the square (U˜ Wi ,U˜ Wj ) ∈ [0, S p] × [0, S p], the
second best (requiring interim participation constraint but not an ex post one) is implemented by the Nash bargaining
protocol and leads to an agreement whenever U˜ Wi + U˜ Wj ≤ 34 S P . But this is also the domain of agreement induced by
the Nash bargaining protocol in our model where outside options are uniformly distributed on the triangle 	 which can
be viewed as a restriction of the uniform distribution to a subset of [0, S p] × [0, S p]. This implies that the allocation
resulting from the Nash bargaining protocol induces the second best in our particular setup.
Indeed by contradiction, assume that in our setup where outside options are uniformly distributed on the trian-
gle 	, there is a mechanism  that generates a strictly higher expected welfare than the Nash bargaining protocol.
It would then be possible to improve upon the second best of the M-S setup, which we call the M S mechanism.
To this purpose, note that any “no commitment” truthful direct mechanism (i.e. satisfying the ex post participation
constraints) is a truthful mechanism in the M-S setup (i.e. satisfying the interim participation constraint). Hence, in
the M-S setup, we can build a mechanism ′ stipulating: for (U˜ Wi ,U˜ Wj ) ∈ 	, we have ′(U˜ Wi ,U˜ Wj ) = (U˜ Wi ,U˜ Wj )
and for (U˜ Wi ,U˜
W
j ) ∈ [0, S p]2 − 	, we have ′(U˜ Wi ,U˜ Wj ) = M S(U˜ Wi ,U˜ Wj ). From the previous remark, such a
mechanism ′ is a truthful direct mechanism. Moreover as  generates a strictly higher expected welfare than the Nash
bargaining protocol on 	, we have that ′ generates a strictly higher expected welfare than the Nash bargaining protocol
on the whole domain [0, S p]× [0, S p]. But this is in contradiction with the fact that the Nash bargaining protocol is the
second best for (U˜ Wi ,U˜
W
j ) uniformly distributed on [0, S p]× [0, S p].
APPENDIX B. EQUILIBRIUM VALUE OF THE PROBABILITY OF WAR
Country i’s welfare under peace is U Pi = U (xi ), where xi ≡ (Lˆi , Lˆ j ,Ti j ,Tih); under war, country i’s welfare is stochas-
tic (see equation (2)) but equal on average to an equilibrium value U Wi = U
[
xi (1−)
]
with  ≡ (λ,λ,−τbil,−τmulti).
The probability of escalation to war between country i and country j , given by equation (3), is then:
Pr(escalationi j ) = 1− 14V 2
[
U (xi )−U (xi (1−))+U (x j )−U (x j (1−))
]2
U (xi (1−))U (x j (1−)) .
To obtain closed-form solutions, we assume that the two countries are identical (however, they may be different
from the other countries in the world): xi = x j . We restrict our attention to first-order effects and use a Taylor expansion
around an equilibrium where countries are identical, such that:
Pr(escalationi j )  1− 1V 2
[

∇U(xi )
U (xi )
]2
,
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which can be rewritten, using equation (7) as equation (8) in the text with
W1 ≡ 1+ 1
σ −1

 LˆiR∑
h=1
Lˆh T 1−σih
+
Lˆ j T 1−σi j
R∑
h=1
Lˆh T 1−σih

= 1+ 1σ −1
(
mii
Ei
+ mi j
Ei
)
> 0
W2 ≡
Lˆ j T 1−σi j
R∑
h=1
Lˆh T 1−σih
= mi j
Ei
> 0; W3 ≡
R∑
h = j,i
Lˆh T 1−σih
R∑
h=1
Lˆh T 1−σih
=
R∑
h = j,i
mih
Ei
> 0.
Using the national accounting identity: miiEi +
mi j
Ei
+∑Rh = j,i mihEi = 1, we obtain equation (9) in the text. Differen-
tiating equation (8) with respect to Ti j yields results mentioned in the text:
d Pr(1− escalationi j )
d
(−Ti j ) = 2Pr(1− escalationi j )1/2
σ −1
V
mi j
Ei Ti j

τbil
(
1− mi j
Ei
)
+
(
λ
σ −1 − τmulti
) R∑
h = j,i
mih
Ei

 .
Differentiating equation (8) with respect to Tih yields:
d Pr(1− escalationi j )
d (−Tih) = −2Pr(1− escalih)
1/2 σ −1
V
mih
Ei Tih

τbil mi jEi +
(
λ
σ −1 − τmulti
)1− R∑
h = j,i
mih
Ei



 .
Using these two equations in the case of identical countries, we obtain the effect of globalization:
d Pr(1− escalationi j )
d (−T ) = −2Pr(1− escalationi j )
1/2 σ −1
V
mihmii
E2i T
(R −2)
(
λ
σ −1 − τmulti −
τbil
R −2
)
,
which proves Result 1.
APPENDIX C. EXAMPLES OF CONFLICTS
Table A1 provides examples of representative conflicts that are classified as MIDs in our sample. For each hostility level,
two cases with narratives from the COW project are presented.
APPENDIX D. DATA SOURCES
Bilateral trade is constructed from two different data sets. The first one is the data set assembled by Katherine Barbieri
(see http://people.cas.sc.edu/barbierk/databases.html), which uses mostly information from the IMF since World War II
and from the League of Nations international trade statistics and various other sources including individual countries
before World War II. Her data spans over the 1870–1992 period. We completed it for the post-World War II period
using the IMF DOTS database (the same primary source as Barbieri, 2002, for this period). Income data come from
three different sources. We use in priority the Penn World Tables (6.2). These data are complemented by two different
sources, Barbieri (2002), which assembles a data set for the 1948–1992 period, and the World Bank’s WDI database
for 1960–2000. Variables accounting for bilateral trade impediments or facilitating factors (distance, contiguity, and
colonial links) come from the CEPII bilateral distance database (www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm). On the
same site can be found a data set of geographical characteristics of different countries used to obtained areas here. The
dummy for regional trade agreements includes all agreements listed in Baier and Bergstrand (2004), each under their
different time-varying membership configurations. GATT/WTO membership dates were obtained from the WTO web
site (http://www.wto.org/). For GSP programmes, we use the data set of Rose (2004) made available on his web site.
Kimberly Ann Elliot generously provided data on trade sanctions constructed for the Elliot et al. (2005) study. For
oil exporting countries, we follow the definition given by the IMF DOTS database. Communist regime spells come from
the CIA world factbook. The primary goods export share of GDP comes from Sachs and Warner (2000) available at
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html.
The democracy index for each country comes from the Polity IV database, and we use the composite index that ranks
each country on a −10 to +10 scale in terms of democratic institutions. We also use the correlation between countries’
c© 2008 The Review of Economic Studies Limited
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TABLE A1
Narratives of representative militarized interstate disputes (MIDs)
Countries involved Hostility level Short narrative
Guatemala/Belize 3 1993: Guatemala had long claimed the British colony of British
Honduras (Belize) to be Guatemalan territory. Guatemalan resi-
dents along the border claimed that Belizean soldiers made an in-
cursion to Guatemala and destroyed corn and rice crops. Belize
claimed that the soldiers were operating on Belizean soil. As a re-
sponse, the Guatemalan government dispatched 60 soldiers to the
disputed border.
Togo/Ghana 3 1994: Togo claims an incursion of 100 fighters (irregulars) from
Ghana and accuses Ghana of supporting rebels. Togo closes its bor-
der with Ghana based on this claim. Ghana denies any involvement
and accuses Togo of aggression. This MID is the border closing by
Togo.
Cameroun/Nigera 4 1995: Camerounian troops attacked a Nigerian post, captured it,
and lost it later in a Nigerian counter-offensive.
U.S./Iraq 4 The FBI determined that the Iraqi government undertook a plot
to assassinate former President Bush when he visited Kuwait in
mid-April, 1993. The Clinton administration retaliated by launch-
ing a cruise missile strike against an Iraqi intelligence facility in
downtown Baghdad.
Ethiopia/Eritrea 5 In May, 1998, border skirmishes between Ethiopia and Eritrea
spun into the world’s largest conventional war at the time. The war
displaced hundreds of thousands of residents and claimed several
thousands causalities. In June 2000, Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a
cease-fire and a permanent peace treaty in December.
Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Iraq/Israel 5 1966-67: Six Day War Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Iraq against Israel
positions during votes on resolutions in the General Assembly of the United Nations as an index of their “political affin-
ity.” The UN votes correlation is based on the roll-call votes. This form of vote happens when one member state requests
the recording of the vote so that its stand, or the stand of another member state, on the issue under discussion is clearly
identified. This recording must be requested before the voting is conducted. This annual database, created by Gartzke
et al. (1999), covers the 1946–1996 period. Military expenditures and alliances come from the COW project web site.
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